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Christopher Yeomans. The Expansion of Autonomy. Hegel’s Pluralistic
Philosophy of Action. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. ISBN
978-0-19-939454-8 (hbk). Pp. 228. £45.90.
Christopher Yeomans’s new book is devoted to explaining what kind of moral
psychology and philosophy of action guide Hegel’s effort to grant objectivity to
Kant’s concept of a self-determining will and even to demonstrate its
actualization in particular forms of citizenship. The challenge is to illuminate
how Hegel’s concept of freedom—abstractly understood as ‘being at home with
oneself in the other’, or recognizing oneself in an other—entails that our moral
duty is to meet the obligations of a particular social role (the farmer, the
craftsman, the industrial producer, the public servant, and so on), while
recognizing that these social roles are both chosen by agents and socially
defined. According to Yeomans, ‘more than anyone else in the tradition, Hegel
tries to work out in detail the way in which individual agency is compatible with
deep ties and influences that come with being a social and embodied
subject’ (82).
The book is divided into three parts. The first offers a reconstruction of
Hegel’s critical appraisal of Kant’s concept of autonomy in the context of his
reception of the Doctrine of Virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals. There Kant tries
to specify the duties of beings like us not naturally inclined to act according to
the moral law: initially, the duty of developing their very capacity to act morally.
One of the aims of Yeomans’s book is to show that Hegel’s philosophy, in
this domain, develops immanently from the Kantian approach. For this reason,
Yeomans’s argument is built upon Kant’s understanding of virtue as the
individualization of duty (15).
Yeomans argues that Hegel’s concept of self-determination (Selbstbestim-
mung) is constituted by three different sub-projects: a generic affective
identification with our own existence and life (self-appropriation), the
specification of the content of this life in preferences, plans, interests, etc., that
we can take as our own (specification of content), and the effective realization by
ourselves of the ends that this specification determines (effectiveness) (2 f.).
Yeomans considers Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue to already address the first two,
and Fichte’s work on ethics, continuing the investigations of the Metaphysics of
Morals, to emphasize the importance of the third. But Hegel viscerally
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disapproves of his predecessors’ idea that moral duty contradicts—and therefore
must subdue—natural inclinations toward self-interest insofar as they adulterate
genuine moral motivation. Hegel also strenuously resists the claim that our
practical faith in God’s role as judge and rewarder will reconnect what
Transcendental Idealism has axiomatically set apart. For Hegel, on these premises
the essential expressive ingredient of the concept of self-determination cannot find
satisfaction, as Yeomans argues (80).
The first part culminates in a chapter that lays out the alternative moral
psychology that underlies Hegel’s non-empiricist, and indeed expressivist, way of
expanding and particularizing the concept of self-determination. The key
concepts of Hegel’s moral psychology are, for Yeomans, talents and interests,
understood not as dispositions, but as distinctive modes of activity that are
objective (public) and constitutive of the agent (73). Talents help to anchor
actions in their circumstances, since they are themselves circumstantial and
modes of access to other circumstances. Interests determine the way in which
human beings make these circumstances their own and give them the shape of
their own self. Interests represent the element of agency that the agent cannot
dissociate herself from, according to Yeomans, since we cannot have interests
that we do not identify with (81).
The second part of the book is divided into three chapters, each of which
examines one of the three sub-projects that, according to Yeomans, constitute
the moments or aspects of Hegel’s concept of self-determination. The main
thread of this part is a novel interpretation of the ‘Morality’ chapter in Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right. Yeomans thinks that the rights of subjectivity and objectivity
that ‘Morality’ successively addresses define three forms of accountability or even
agency, inseparable but distinguishable, that correspond to those expressive
projects. But Yeomans does not only provide a novel analysis. Additionally, he
tries to show how the different forms of life characteristic of what Hegel (as was
usual in his time) calls ‘estates’ (Stände)—that of peasantry, craftsmen, industrial
producers, soldiers, public officials, scholars, and merchants—amount to
differently structured embodiments of the projects of self-appropriation,
specification of content and effectiveness. At the same time, he observes
ineradicable tensions and unavoidable compromises between those projects. The
result of Yeomans’s substantial interpretative work is an overview of Hegel’s
understanding of the multiple forms of self-determining agency realized in and
through distinct social roles, each embodying a different combination of those
aspects of self-expression and deserving for that reason equal respect and
recognition. As he sees it, it is this multiplicity of adequate embodiments that
Hegel’s philosophy of action is intended to capture (90, 127).
The Expansion of Autonomy’s concluding chapter constitutes a separate part.
In this chapter, Yeomans tries to show that such a plural social objectification of
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individual self-determination conceptually satisfies four desiderata arising from
the shortcomings perceived by Hegel in Kant’s Doctrine of Virtue. The first
desideratum is to oppose the Kantian view of morality and freedom as a ‘fight’ of
reason against nature not with a simplistic Hobbesian compatibilist conception
of free agency, but with an ethical analysis of the principled particularization of
paradigmatic moral ends (such as beneficence) in material ends (like hospitality
in the case of farmers) through the development of specific moral attitudes
toward other agents in the context of the forms of life of the different estates.
A second desideratum, namely, to overcome the mechanistic threat to agency and
particularly to a robust sense of selfhood in action, is met by the concept of
‘character’ (Yeomans’s translation of Gesinnung, see 114), insofar as Hegel sees
character as the result of a dynamic interaction of talents and interests through
which the self can recognize more and more her own shape. Hegel’s third
achievement is said to consist in a correct appraisal of some non-empiricist
resources for the explanation of action that seem to suit an expressivist view,
such as circumstances, character, common projects and interests. Finally,
Yeomans shows, by means of concrete examples, that Hegel’s philosophy of
action provides objective criteria for distinguishing deception and hypocrisy from
integrity in the moral behaviour of members of different estates, thus succeeding
where Kant and Fichte’s ‘empty formalism’ seemed to fail.
There are many things to agree with in Yeomans’s argument. Firstly, he is
surely right in emphasizing the importance of the individualization of duty and
the problem of formalism for Hegel’s ethical theory. It is also true, it seems to
me, that Hegel’s concept of self-determination is fundamentally expressivist and
that, as a consequence, the central ethical concept is for him ‘character’ or
mindedness (Gesinnung) and that a conceptualization of mundane bootstrapping
toward morality and rationality is to be found at the core of his moral psychology
(89 f.). I am also willing to subscribe to the interpretation of his philosophy of
action as teleological and non-empiricist.
From the point of view of the exegesis of Hegel’s work, perhaps the
most controversial aspect of Yeomans’s book is the way in which it connects
purpose, intention and the good—the three topics of ‘Morality’—to the
expressive projects of self-appropriation, specification of content, and effective-
ness. It is also questionable whether the preservation of a moral point of view in
ethical life (Sittlichkeit) should be understood in terms of the particularization of
those projects. It would be possible to argue that the moral point of view,
analysed by Hegel in three different underdetermined kinds of accountability, is
rather a one-sided approach to action that must be sublated into properly
institutionalized ethical perspectives. More than aspects of self-determination,
purpose, intention and the good may signal limited understandings of
accountability that progressively correct each other and are jointly unsatisfactory.
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Equally controversial, in my view, is Yeomans’s interpretation of subjectivity and
objectivity in §§25–26 of the Philosophy of Right as ingredients to be combined or
coordinated in a general ethical project.
Even more striking is that Yeomans does not consider the specifically
political role of the estates, a role that in my view is essential to Hegel’s philosophy
of ethical life. As Hegel gives so much importance to the political realization
of freedom, one might have expected a discussion of the rationality and
moral or ethical value of the political order. To say that the book explores just
‘one line’ of the expansion of autonomy (2) and that the political role of the
members of the states is ‘complicated by Hegel’s unique philosophy of law’
(7) seems a shallow justification for ignoring this central element in Hegel’s
argumentation.
The bracketing of this aspect goes hand in hand with a significant disregard
for the specifically modern articulation of ethical life. In fact, The Expansion of
Autonomy does not properly address the rationality of the modern family, modern
civil society and modern political representation, despite its claim that the
individual project of self-determination is to be advanced by taking part in
objective institutions. Yeomans certainly appears to conceive his investigation as a
complement, rather than an alternative, to the discussion of such rationality. But
it remains for me unclear how a psychological understanding of the project of
self-determination could be combined with a non-psychological approach (such
as, for instance, Robert Pippin’s). It seems difficult to reconcile Yeomans’s view
of talent as the objective side of the idea (in Hegel’s technical sense of the term)
(195) with the more common view of institutions as freedom-realizers.
A different question is whether Yeomans succeeds in reaching his own
limited purpose: to present the diverse characters of Hegel’s social world
(the farmer, the craftsman, etc.) as authentic moral figures, in which the ideal of
self-determination and particularly of self-expression is adequately attained.
A proper evaluation of this achievement cannot be undertaken here; but
interestingly, Yeomans himself seems only moderately satisfied in this regard: he
admits that ‘in all fairness…though Hegel has gone further in the direction of
the expansion into the particular than Kant or Fichte, on his own terms even the
system reconstructed here…cannot be considered the finished article of such
expansion’ (196).
Nevertheless, Yeomans’s work excels in elaborating scarcely explored
connections between Hegel’s moral philosophy and social theory and Kant’s and
Fichte’s accounts of virtue, in its detailed analysis of the estates from a moral
point of view, and in defending a new understanding of the so-called
‘overcoming’ of morality in the substance of ethical life. The Expansion of
Autonomy will not only be of interest to Hegel scholars and historians of
philosophy. As Yeomans persuasively shows, the debates between Kantians and
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Hegelians about the way in which particular social roles might actualize the
abstract moral ideal of self-realization remain fundamental for contemporary
ethics and contemporary philosophy of action.
Edgar Maraguat
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